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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
****************************************************** *
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)
:
:

Case No. 20010116-SC

:
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)

Argument Priority: (15)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

BRIEF OF APPELLANT BOHNE
Appeal from a Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order
of Probation and Certificate of Probable Cause, filed August 3,1998, by the Fifth
Judicial District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, the honorable Robert T.
Braithwaite, presiding.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEANNE B.INOUYE (1618)
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160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
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Page 1 o f

J. BRYAN JACKSON, (4488)
J. BRYAN JACKSON, P.C.
157 East Center Street
Post Office Box 519
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0519
(435) 586-8450
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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2-2 (3)(a)(1953, as amended), to review the opinion of the Court of
Appeals filed January 11, 2001.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE NO 1: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of
Section 58-55-305 (6), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in concluding that
the exemption only applied to the sale or merchandising of personal property and
excluded construction of modular homes off site.
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its application of the
legal presumption placing upon the Appellant in a criminal case the burden of
producing sufficient evidence or facts to qualify for a statutory exemption to which
the Appellant is entitled as a matter of right.
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the trial court erred in finding the Appellant guilty of the
crime of contracting without a license, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 58-55-301 (1953, as amended), and not exempt from licensing
under Section 305 of the same Chapter.
///
///
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ISSUE NO. 4: Whether the trial court erred In its interpretation of Utah Code
Annotated § 58-55-305 (6) ( 1953, as amended), excluding the Appellant from
exemption as a person engaged in the sale or merchandising of personal property
and therefore subject to the licensing requirements in the construction trades in the
State of Utah.
ISSUE NO. 5: Whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statutory
authority for the regulation of the construction trades by including Appellant an off
site modular home fabricator within the same regulatory scheme, requiring that
Appellant be licensed as a contractor in the State of Utah when in engaged in the
fabrication of off site modular housing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Appellant believes that the central issues are of law and statutory
interpretation and that the appropriate standard of review is one of correctness. The
matter was presented to the trial court upon stipulated facts in summary judgment
fashion. In as much as a challenge to summary judgment presents for review
conclusions of law only, review of those conclusions is for correctness, without
according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. See Bonham v. Morgan,
788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). When faced with a question of statutory construction, the
reviewing Courtfirstlooks to the plain language of the statute. CIG Exploration. Inc.
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v. Utah State Tax Commission. 897 P.2d 1214,1216 (Utah 1995); see also State v.
Larson. 865 P.2d 1355,1357 (Utah 1993); Schurtz v. BMW of North Amercia Inc..
814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991). Only if the Court finds some ambiguity need it
look further. CIG Exploration. Inc.. 897 P.2d at 1216; See also Schurtz. 814 P.2d at
1112; World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency. 879 P.2d 253, 259, (Utah
1994). Only when the reviewing Court finds ambiguity in the statute's plain language
need it seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations.
CIG Exploration. Inc.. 897 P.2d at 1216; See also Bevnon v. St. George - Dixie
Lodge Number 1743. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks. 854 P.2d 513, 518
(Utah 1993). If doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an
Act's provisions, the Court should analyze the Act in its entirety and harmonize its
provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose. CIG Exploration.
Inc.. 897 P.2d at 1216; see also Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty. 608 P.2d 242,243
(Utah 1980). However, this matter also involved the taking of testimony and the trial
court also made as part of its Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence
and Probation and Certificate of Probable Cause certain findings and conclusions
and with regard to the same Appellant asserts that as they concern questions of law
the standard of review is one of "correctness" and as they concern questions of fact,
the standard of review is one of "clearly erroneous." See State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d
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774(Utah 1991) and State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048 (Ut App. 1991); See also State
v. Gibbons. 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989); and State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885 (Utah
1978).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutory provisions which Appellant believes to be applicable are as
follows:
1.

Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2 (3)(a) (1953, as amended).

2.

Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-301 (1953, as amended).

3.

Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-305 (6) (1953, as amended).

4.

Utah Code Annotated § 58-56-1 et seq. (1953, as amended).

5.

Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-102 (5) (1953, as amended).

6.

Utah Code Annotated § 58-56-3 (12) (1953, as amended).

7.

Utah Code Annotated § 58-56-4 (1953, as amended).

8.

Utah Code Annotated § 58-56-6 (1953, as amended).

9.

Utah Code Annotated § 58-56-15 (5) (1953, as amended).

The full text of the statutory provisions are attached hereto at Addendum A to
the appendix.
///
///
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE: This action concerns the Appellant, LARRY G.
BOHNE, who has been involved in the prefabrication of homes since the early
1970's. The homes are assembled off site at Appellant's plant or yard and then
transported to the construction site and delivered to the customer. The customer is
typically a general contractor although occasionally the product is sold to a home
owner who demonstrates sufficient experience in the construction field. The
Appellant has held a general contractor's license in the past but chose not to renew
the same when he went into the business of off site prefabrication exclusively. The
Appellant's product is one that is characterized statutorily as modular housing in that
it is constructed, assembled or manufactured pursuant to the requirements of the
Uniform Building Code as adopted by the State of Utah and not according to the
federal building requirements of Housing and Urban Development for manufactured
housing.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION: On or about the 8th day
of December, 1997, the Appellant was charged with contracting without a license
alleging that on or about the 11th day of November, 1996, the Appellant intentionally
and knowingly engaged in a construction trade, acting as a contractor in a
construction trade requiring licensure.

In May, 1998, the State amended its
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information alleging three (3) additional counts for violations occurring on November
4, 1996, May 8, 1997, and March 30, 1998. See the record as page 61-63. The
matter was initially set for jury trial but upon the State's motion in limine, filed on or
about the 22nd day of May, 1998, the matter was set before the trial court to review
from the standpoint of statutory interpretation. Id at pages 68-71. The jury trial was
vacated, stipulated facts were submitted to the Court and testimony was received,
primarily on what members of the Division of Professional Licensing (hereafter
"Division") and of the private sector understood the statutory language to mean.
On or about the 3rd day of August, 1998, the trial court filed its Judgment,
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Certificate of
Probable Cause, finding the Appellant, LARRY G. BOHNE, guilty of the offense of
contracting without a license, a class A misdemeanor, sentencing the Appellant per
statute with a stay of execution of sentence and order of probation ordering that he
obey all laws, and not engage in the practice of contracting without first obtaining a
license from the Utah Department of Professional Licensing. Id at page 99; see also
the Appellant's Addendum B to Appendix attached hereto and incorporated herein
by this reference. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law as part
of its certificate of probable cause in support of the its interpretation of the statute.
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Notice of Appeal was filed on or about the 24th day of August, 1998. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal on or about the 3rd day of February, 2000, see record
at page 105, asserting that the decision was not final since three (3) additional
charges had been stayed involving the same statutory violation.

Thereafter,

charges were dismissed without prejudice, Id at pages 116-117, leaving Count I as
a final judgment and a new notice of appeal was filed on or about the 21 st day of
April, 2000. Id at pages 125-126. The Court of Appealsfiledits decision affirming
the judgment of the trial court on January 11, 2001. Id at pages 131-134. The
Appellant filed a petition for Writ of Certiorari for review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals, on or about the 12,h day of February, 2001. The petition for Writ of
Certiorari was granted on June 20, 2001. See the record at page 139.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Appellant, LARRY G. BOHNE, has been in the business of building
manufactured or modular construction since 1973 (see Trial Transcript at page 126).
The buildings are assembled at his yard in Cedar City, Utah, and then transported
on a trailer (see Trial Transcript at page 27) and typically delivered to a general
contractor or home owner who chooses to get a owner/builder permit as permitted
by law. See Trial Transcript at 128. Appellant supervises the manufacturing
process which includes the assembly of floor decking, walls (exterior and interior),
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the trusses or rafters, the roof decking, the rough electrical wiring, the rough
plumbing (including sinks, tubs, kitchen appliances, showers and lights), the rough
mechanical systems, the shingles, the insulation, the sheet rock, the cabinets, the
painting (exterior and interior), the finishing trim, interior doors, the finishing of
electrical, plumbing, mechanical equipment and thefinishing exterior siding. Seethe
record at page 86, paragraph 2.
2. The modular homes are generally sold assembled as a single unit which
may include multiple floors requiring installation by a licensed contractor or home
owner. The Appellant does not do the site work, e.g. excavation, foundation, utilities,
etc., nor does the Appellant actually install or attach the structure to the foundation.
The Appellant's product typically has a one (1) year warranty although no such
warranty is required by statute. Installation of the unit becomes the responsibility of
the home owner or a licensed contractor. Id. at paragraph 3.
3. The Appellant's manufacturing process does not utilize subcontractors such
as electrical or plumbing. However, all units are inspected by a state licensed ICBO
inspector as provided by statute to insure that all structures meet the requirements
of the general uniform building codes of construction, electrical, plumbing and
mechanical. No structure is allowed to leave the plant until all inspections have been
///
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completed and the structure is determined to be in compliance with those general
building codes. Id. at paragraph 4.
4. The modular home units are not licensed with the Utah State Division of
Motor Vehicles nor are they required by statute to be licensed through the Utah State
Division of Motor Vehicles. Appellant contends that title is typically transferred and
secured through bills of sale and a UCC-I filing with the Secretary of State. The
State argues that an Article I filing does not denote ownership but rather a vested
financial interest. Id. at paragraphs 5 and 6.
5. On or about the 8th day of December, 1997, the Appellant was charged with
contracting without a license, alleging that on or about the 11th day of November,
19916, the Appellant intentionally and knowingly engaged in a construction trade,
acting as a contractor in a construction trade requiring licensure. See the record at
pages 1 and 2.
6. In May, 1998, Respondent amended its information alleging three (3)
additional counts for violations occurring on November 4,1996, April 8, 1997, and
March 30,1998. See the record at pages 61-63. The matter was initially set for a
jury trial but upon the State's motion in limine,filedon or about the 22nd day of May,
1998, the matter was set before the trial court for review from the standpoint of
statutory interpretation. See the record at pages 67 and 68.
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7. The jury trial was vacated, stipulated facts were submitted to the trial court
and testimony was received, primarily on what members of the Division and of the
private sector understood the statutory language to mean. See stipulated facts in
the record at pages 85-87.
8. On or about the 3rd day of August, 1998, the trial court filed its Judgment,
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Certificate of
Probable Cause, finding the Appellant, LARRY G. BOHNE, guilty of the offense of
contracting without a license, a class A misdemeanor, sentencing him per statute
with a Stay of Execution of Sentence and Order of Probation ordering that he obey
all laws, and not engage in the practice of contracting without first obtaining a license
from the Utah Department of Professional Licensing. See the record at pages 95-99.
The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law as part of its Certificate
of Probable Cause in support of its interpretation of the statute. Id. The Notice of
Appeal was filed on the 24th day of August, 1998. See the record at page 101.
9. On or about the 3rd day of February, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a
Memorandum Decision dismissing the appeal because it was not taken from a final
appealable judgment since there were remaining counts pending in the trial court
and the Appellant did not timely seek permission from the Court of Appeals to
Appeal from an Interlocutory Order.
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10. On or about the 23rd day of March, 2000, the Fifth Judicial District Court
of Iron County, State of Utah, upon the State's motion, dismissed the remaining
counts pending against the Appellant and he renewed his appeal on the 21 st day of
April, 2000, of the trial court's final judgment. See the record at pages 116-117.
11. On the 11* day of January, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision. See record of pages 131-134; See addendum "C" to the appendix
attached hereto, and incorporated herein.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The Appellant contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
trial court's Judgment and Sentence and that such constitutes a departure from the
ordinary and usual course of judicial proceedings or sanctions such a departure by
the trial court as to call for the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision.
The Appellant further asserts that the issues decided by the Court of Appeals
involved important questions of state law which have not been and should be settled
by the Supreme Court. Particularly, the Appellant contends that the decision of the
Court of Appeals interpreting the personal property exemption to exclude builders
and contractors is not supported by statutory law, the practice within the industry or
the understanding of the plain meaning of the statutory language for exemption.
Although the concurring opinion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the plain
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meaning of the statutory language, the Appellant contends that it is in error for
placing the burden proof upon the Appellant to establish qualification for the
exemption in the context of a criminal offense.
2. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the
crime of contracting without a license, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 58-55-301 (1953, as amended), and not exempt from licensing
under Section 305 of the same Chapter. The Utah Construction Trades Licensing
Act provides exemption for a person engaged in the sale or merchandising of
personal property that by its design or manufacture may be attached, installed or
otherwise affixed to real property who has contracted with a person, firm or
corporation licensed under the Act to install, affix or attach that property. The Utah
Uniform Building Standards Act, Chapter 56, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, provides for regulation of a manufactured structure, a "modular unit",
allowing for inspection to insure that when the structure is for human habitation,
occupancy or use, that the same complies with the General Uniform Building Codes
for construction, electrical, plumbing and mechanical. Appellant's construction
meets all such building code requirements. The Chapter does not expressly require
the manufacturer to be licensed under the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act.
The finding made by the trial court as argued by Respondent attempts to exclude
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Appellant from the exemption language of Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-305 (6)
(1953, as amended), by limiting the personal property exemption to a "sears
exception." The Appellant contends that the trial court's limited and restrictive
definition of personal property is unreasonable, irrational and in conflict with the
statute's plain meaning, failing to provide Appellant with reasonable and proper
notice of criminal misconduct.
3. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Utah
Code Annotated § 58-55-305 (6) (1953, as amended), by excluding Appellant as
exempt as a person engaged in the sale or merchandising of personal property and
therefore subject to the licensing requirement of the construction trades in the State
of Utah. In reviewing an issue of statutory interpretation with regard to a criminal
statute, the reviewing court reviews the trial court's interpretation for correctness and
utilizes the plain meaning of words and phrases used within the statute. No
particular deference is granted to the trial court's interpretation. The primary
consideration in construing the statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent in
which it first looks to the plain language of the statute and only when the statute's
language is ambiguous will the Court seek guidance from the legislative history and
policy considerations. The reviewing Court assumes that such terms in the statute
are used advisedly; thus, the statutory words are read literally, unless such reading
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is unreasonably confused or inoperable. The Court will not infer substated terms in
the text that are not already there. The Court will not rewrite the statute to conform
with an intention not expressed. The Appellant contends that the use of the term
"personal property" has a clear and well established meaning in the law. The
Respondent's more restrictive use of the term to only include personal property
under the "sears exception," is not based on any statutory provision and is
inconsistent with the Respondent's further rationale that the Appellant's product is
excluded from exemption because it is not registered with the Department of Motor
Vehicles and thus, by the Respondent's interpretation of the statute, creates
ambiguity and confusion in its interpretation. The Appellant argues that if the
Legislature intended a more restrictive and limited use of the exemption provided
statutorily, that it would have chosen to use a term other than "personal property,"
to more clearly delineate its intention.
4. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the
statutory authority for the regulation of constriction trades by including the Appellant,
an off site modular housing manufacturer, within the same statutory scheme,
requiring that Appellant be licensed as a contractor in the State of Utah when
engaged in the fabrication of off site modular housing.

While Chapter 55, the

Construction Trades Licensing Act, provides for the regulation of the construction
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trades, Chapter 56, the Utah Construction Uniform Building Standards Act, provides
for the regulatory scheme for modular housing and does not expressly require that
Appellant be licensed in the construction trades as a contractor. The plain reading
of the statutory provisions under both chapters is consistent since modular housing
is "personal property" and therefore fits within the exemption language of section
305 (6). The exemption language however, requires that such personal property be
installed or affixed on real property by a licensed contractor. The Respondent's
limited and restrictive interpretation of "personal property," in addition to creating
unnecessary ambiguity, expands the division's authority to require that certain
providers of personal property be licensed as contractors under the Utah
Construction Trades Act with no clear delineation as to which items of "personal
property" would be exempt from such licensing requirements. Since such an
interpretation would have far reaching ramifications within the industry which would
be inconsistent with the common and universal understanding of personal property
for those within the industry, the Appellant contends that such an expansion goes
beyond any budgetary concerns of fiscal responsibility for enforcement. If the
Legislature intended to adopt such a regulatory scheme, then it would have more
directly and clearly manifested its expression and not left the matter to be inferred
by the Division's narrow interpretation of "personal property."
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ARGUMENT
The Appellant first considers the issues raised by the Court of Appeals'
decision in affirming the trial court's judgment which the Appellant believes is a
departure from the ordinary and usual course of judicial proceedings or sanctions
such a departure by the trial court to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's
power of supervision. Since Appellant believes that the issue is one that has not
previously been addressed by the Utah Supreme Court for interpretation regarding
these statutory provisions, the Appellant asserts that the same is one that should be
settled by the Supreme Court.
POINT NO. I
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN ERROR,
INTERPRETING THE PERSONAL PROPERTY EXEMPTION TO EXCLUDE
OFF SITE BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS.
Section 305 (6), Chapter 55, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, is part of the language found under the Utah Construction Trades
Licensing Act exempting the requirement of licensing and pertains to those engaged
in the sale or merchandising of personal property that by its design or manufacture
may be attached, installed or otherwise affixed to real property who has contracted
with a person, firm, or corporation licensed under this Chapter to install, affix or
attach that property. The decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in January,
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2001, was a split decision with a majority and concurring view. The majority view
of the decision concludes that the Appellant did not qualify for the exemption since
he also constructed modular units. In pertinent part the Court of Appeals states:
Appellant asserts that he is exempt from the Act's licensing
requirements by virtue of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-55-305(6)
(1997). However, the licensing exemption in Section 58-55-305(6)
applies only to "the sale or merchandising of personal property." Id.
There is no dispute that in addition to selling and merchandising
modular homes, Appellant also constructs them. No language in
Section 58-55-305(6) exempts the construction of buildings from the
licensing requirement.... Appellant's construction of modular homes
does not fall within the plain meaning of "sale or merchandising";
therefore, the licensing exemption in Section 58-55-305(6) does not
apply. Id. at paragraph 10. (emphasis added)
This interpretation strongly conflicts with the introductory language found
within the same Section 305 which reads as follows:
In addition to the exemptions from licensure in Section 58-55-307, the
following persons may engage in acts included within the practice of
construction trades subject to the stated circumstances and limitation
without being licensed under this Chapter:
The opinion of Judge Thorne, who concurs in the result, takes issue with the
majority view. In pertinent part he states:
By virtue of specific inclusion in the construction trades licensing
chapter, a person engaged in this "trade" is bound by the licensing
requirements of the code unless exempted. It makes no sense to
interpret the exemption provisions in Section 58-55-305(6) as
exempting only sales persons from the licensing requirements, since
Section 58-55-301 does not require such persons be licensed in the
first place. Furthermore, precluding those persons the chapter actually
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requires to be licensed from using the Section 58-55-305(6) exemption
flies the face of common sense and renders the statutory exemption
nugatory. Accordingly, I conclude that being a "contractor/builder" does
not preclude a person from utilizing the exemption. Id at paragraph 19.
(emphasis added)
The opinion of Judge Thome also addresses the issue of whether Appellant's
modular homes are personal property or real property and points out that the
question is one avoided by the majority view which relies upon the case of John
Wagner Assoc, v Hercules. Inc.. at 797 P.2d 1123. (Ut. App. 1990). That case
deals with modular building construction on site making the case largely
distinguishable from Appellant's circumstances where construction is entirely off site
and cannot be considered a fixture even by "force of gravity alone" as may have
been rightly concluded under the circumstances in the Hercules decision.
The majority view's reliance upon the Hercules decision is not well reasoned
since the factual circumstances, while similar in considering modular construction,
involved construction on site where the question of such property being affixed was
more the issue in contrast to Appellant's case where construction was entirely off site
and the assembled units sold while still in the construction yard. Unlike Hercules,
the "attached by gravity" argument did not change the nature of the property from
personalty to reality. The majority's view fails to address the issue of personal
property in the context of the provision's language and its focus upon construction
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confuses the understanding and application of the exemption and renders
ambiguous its plain meaning.
In considering a decision by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court reviews
for correctness and give its conclusions of law no deference. Newspaper Agency
v. Audit Div. Tax Com'n.. 938 P.2d 266 (Utah 1997).This standard of review applies
also to the conclusions made by the trial court. See Landes v. Capital City Bank..
795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990). The rules of statutory interpretation mandate the Court
to look "first to the plain language of the statute... and to assume that each term was
used advisably by the legislature." See Biddle v. Washington Terrace City. 993 P.2d
875 (Utah 1999); see also Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake Civ. Ser.. 908 P.2d 871
(Ut. App. 1995). The interpretation must be based on the language used, the Court
has no power to rewrite the statute to conform with an interpretation not expressed.
Salt Lake City. 908 P.2d at 875. The majority opinion's interpretation of the
exemption, excluding builders and contractors, confuses the plain meaning of the
statutory exemption language and constitutes a departure from the ordinary and
usual course of judicial proceedings or sanctions such a departure by the trial court
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision.
///
///
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There has been no decision made by the Utah Supreme Court on this
important question regarding the scope and application of the personal property
exemption as it relates to the construction trades and the issue is one hotly
contested as to its intended meaning. The Appellant believes that while the Court
of Appeals decision has done little to clarify the ongoing conflict, it has in fact added
to the confusion by failing to resolve the question of personal property' as it applies
to off site modular construction or assembly.
POINT NO. 2
THE CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE THORNE IS REASONED MORE
CONSISTENTLY WITH THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTORY
LANGUAGE BUT PLACES THE BURDEN OF PROOF UPON THE
DEFENDANT IN THE CONTEXT OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE AND
THEREFORE IS IN ERROR.
The concurring decision of Judge Thome, regarding the statutory interpretation
of Section 305 is consistent with that derived from the plain meaning of the
language. He concludes that Appellant's modular homes, not yet being affixed to
land, satisfied the personal property prong of the exemption, until they are affixed.
He points out that to qualify for the exemption further requires that the individual
contract with a person, firm or corporation licensed to install, affix or attach such
property. He notes that the stipulated facts presented to the trial court, as well as
the responses concerning the subject during oral argument, reveal that the question
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of whether the recipient of Appellant's modular home was licensed under the
Construction Trades Licensing Act
were not answered. He concludes by finding that a person claiming statutory
exemption has the burden of producing sufficient facts to qualify for the exemption.
On this final point, the Appellant takes exception.
In the context of the present case, Appellant was convicted of contracting
without a license, a class A misdemeanor. Utah law is clear on the presumption of
innocence as a basic component of a fair trial secured by the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution. See State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 487 (Utah 1988);
see also Estelle v. Williams. 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S. Ct. 1691,1692,48 L Ed.2d
126 (1976).
The State has the burden of proof as to every element of the offense and the
Court is obliged to construe a statute in a way that is consistent with such a
presumption to avoid constitutional deficiencies. State v. Crediford. 927 P.2d 1129,
1133 (Wash. 1996).
The more appropriate determination consistent with Appellant's constitutional
right of presumption of innocense would have been to find that the State had failed
to meet its burden of proof and reversed. In the alternative, the Court of Appeals
could have followed the ordinary and usual course of judicial proceedings and
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remanded. In Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Ut. App. 1991), the Utah Court
of Appeals set forth its own standard of review on the matter, stating:
Unless the record clearly and uncontrovertedly supports the trial court's
decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires
remand for more detailed findings by the trial Court. Id at 472. See
also State v. Loveqren. 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Ut. App. 1990).
Where the evidence is unclear in the record as to the existence or
nonexistence of an element necessary to support the conviction of Appellant on the
charge of contracting without a license, interpreting existing law in a way to place
the burden upon the Defendant to produce sufficient facts to qualify for an exemption
compromises constitutional protection for all perspective defendants and constitutes
a substantial departure from the ordinary and usual course of judicial proceedings
or sanctions such a departure by the trial court as to call for an exercise of the
Supreme Court's power of supervision.
POINT NO. 3
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGES
THE ACCEPTED UNDERSTANDING OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY
EXEMPTION
WITHIN THE INDUSTRY.
The Appellant contends that the interpretation of this statutory exemption is
more than whether a person committed the crime of contracting without a license.
It has industry wide ramifications. The decision of the Court of Appeals will require
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those involved at any level of off site construction or fabrication to now be licensed
as general contractors in the State of Utah. This goes beyond the regulatory scheme
provided by the Legislature. Chapter 55, regulates the construction trades. Chapter
56, regulates manufactured and modular housing. The two (2) are separate and
form the statutory framework for on site and off site construction. There is nothing
to suggest that those engaged in manufactured or modular housing should also be
licensed under Chapter 55. No provision of either chapter expressly makes licensing
a requirement when construction only involves personal property. Those operating
within the industry have relied upon the personal property exemption to supply off
site assembled materials often in the form of custom work like cabinets and trusses
which now will require licensing of the provider.
The Court of Appeals decision extends the regulatory authority of the Division
of Professional Licensing into areas where federal law exempts such authority such
as in the area of HUD homes and virtually eliminates the personal property
exemption under the statute as predicted by Judge Thorne. Such an interpretation
exceeds the regulatory authority and budgetary constraints of fiscal responsibility for
enforcement.
This expansion of regulatory authority exceeds that mandate which is
expressly provided by statute. The Utah Uniform Building Standards Act, Utah Code
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Ann. § 58-56-6 (1953, as amended), delineates the Division's duties and
responsibilities and Utah Code Ann. § 58-56-15 (1953, as amended), refers
specifically to the Division's responsibility for factory built housing and modular units.
Subsection (5) reads as follows:
The Division...
(5) May inspect the work of all modular units manufactured in the State
during the construction process to determine compliance of the
manufacturer with the Utah Uniform Building Standards Act for those
units to be installed within the State; and upon finding any substantive
deficiency issue a corrective order to the manufacturer with a copy to
the local regulator to the State's political subdivision in which the unit
is to be installed.
Appellant contends that if it truly was the Legislature's intent to adopt a
regulatory scheme to require manufacturers to be licensed as contractors, that the
same would have been more clearly mandated by its directive and expression of
duties and authority and not left to be inferred or implied by judicial interpretation of
the personal property exemption.
The rationale offered by the Court of Appeals, that of protecting the public, is
not well taken. Since, the units are purchased before attachment, there is noriskof
subcontractor liens being filed on the real property of the home owner. The product
is inspected to be built to code prior to the sale. The legislative purpose of
protecting the public from "inept and financially irresponsible builders" put forth by
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the majority view would only apply to improvements made upon the land itself and
a close reading of the personal property exemption discloses that such protection
was contemplated in qualifying as Judge Thorne points out. The majority's view
requires two licensed contractors, one constructing the unit and one installing the
unit. This substantially changes what has come to be the practice in the industry
which presently only requires a licensed contractor responsible for installation or
improvement on site.
Since the issues before the Utah Supreme Court involve a review of the
decision made by the Utah Court of Appeals on the basis of a correctness standard,
the Appellant contends that the issues before the Court of Appeals as presented
before it for consideration offer some basis for this Court's review and consideration.
POINT NO. 4
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIME OF CONTRACTING WITHOUT A LICENSE, A CLASS A
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 58-55-301
(1953, as amended) AND NOT EXEMPT FROM LICENSING UNDER § 305
OF THE SAME CHAPTER.
The licensing requirements for any person engaged in the construction trades are
found at Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-301 (1953, as amended). In pertinent part
it states:
///
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(1 )(a) Any person engaged in the construction trades shall
become licensed under this Chapter before engaging in
that trade or contracting activity in this state unless
specifically exempt from licensure under § 58-55-305.
The exemptions from licensure found at Utah Code Annotated §58-55-305
(1953, as amended) provide that persons may engage in acts or practices included
within the construction trades without being licensed and include the following:
(6) A person engaged in the sale or merchandising of
personal property that by its design or manufacture may
be attached, installed, or otherwise affixed to real property
who has contracted with a person, firm, or corporation
licensed under this Chapter to install, affix or attach that
property.
Home owners are similarly exempt when building structures on their property,
see subparagraph (4), or constructing or renovating a residential building for noncommercial, non-public use, see subparagraph (5).
Chapter 55, which encompasses the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act
does not attempt to define or limit the application of personal property. Personal
property is commonly defined as everything that is the subject of ownership, not
coming under the denomination of real estate. Real property is generally understood
to mean land, and whatever is erected or growing upon or affixed to the land. Civil
law makes the distinction as one of movables and immovables. See Black's Law
Dictionary. Whether defined under common law or pursuant to civil law, the
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Appellant's product, a fully assembled residential housing unit built off site, is
personal property until it is affixed to real estate. This is consistent with the initial
definition of construction trade found under the general provisions of the Utah
Construction Trades Licensing Act, Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-102(5) (1953, as
amended), which reads as follows:
(5)

"Construction trade" means any trade or occupation
involving construction, alternation, remolding,
repairing, wreaking or demolition, addition to, or
improvement of any building, highway, road,
railroad, dam, bridge, structure, excavation or other
project, development or improvement to other than
personal property (emphasis added).

Chapter 56, encompasses the Utah Uniform Building Standards Act and
applies to various forms of off site construction including modular construction. Utah
Code Annotated § 58-56-3(12) (1953, as amended) reads as follows:
(12) "Modular unit" means a structure built from sections
which are manufactured in accordance with the
Construction Standards adopted pursuant to § 58-56-4
and transported to a building site, the purpose which is for
human habitation, occupancy, or use.
Section 4 of the Chapter enumerates that the State adopts the General
Uniform Building Codes for construction, electrical, plumbing and mechanical.
Appellant's construction meets all such building code requirements and the units do
not leave his yard until proper inspection has been made. The trial court in issuing
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its Certificate of Probable Cause made certain findings and the Appellant asserts
that the court was in error in finding that Appellant did not sell personal property, that
by its design or manufacture may be installed on real property. The Court's
interpretation comes from being persuaded by the State who attempted to explain
that the personal property exemption of the statute was limited to a certain "sears
exception" and that Appellant's product did not fit within the "sears exception". See
record at page 96 and 97. The Appellant asserts that this limited and restrictive
definition of the statute's use of "personal property" is unreasonable, irrational, in
conflict with the statute's plain meaning, and fails to provide Appellant with
reasonable and proper notice of criminal misconduct.
POINT NO. 5
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED § 58-55-305(6) (1953, as amended), IN EXCLUDING THE
APPELLANT FROM EXEMPTION AS A PERSON ENGAGED IN THE SALE OR
MERCHANDISING OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND THEREFORE SUBJECT
TO THE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION TRADES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
In State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656 (Ut App. 1992) the Court of Appeals reviewed
the issue of statutory interpretation with regard to a criminal statute and set forth
what is the general rule for review of a trial court's statutory interpretation which is
that the same is reviewed on a correction of error standard and that a statute should
be interpreted utilizing the plain meaning of its words. Id. at 662. In State v.
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Winward. 907 P.2d 1188 (Ut App. 1995), the Court of Appeals stated that
interpretation of statute is a question of law, granting no particular deference to the
trial court. Id. at 1190. While the Court of Appeals in that case indicated that the
primary consideration in construing the statute is to give effect to the legislature's
intent, the Court set forth a procedure to follow to discern such intent. In that
instance the Court stated: "To discover [legislative] intent, this Court looksfirstto the
plain language of the statute (other citations omitted) only when the statute's
language is ambiguous will we seek guidance from the legislative history and policy
considerations." Id; see also World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency. 879
P.2d 253,259 (Utah 1994). In Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake Civ. Ser.. 908 P.2d
871 (Ut App. 1995). The Court of Appeals went on to state that it must "assume that
'each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read
literally, unless such reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable," and the
"Courts are not to infer substated terms into the text that are not already there.
Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and the Court has
no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed." Id at 875;
See also Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994).
///
///
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The statutory language utilized in the section for exemption from licensure,
Utah Code Annotated §58-55-305(6) (1953, as amended), clearly utilizes the term
personal property and does not by any definition attempt to restrict its meaning to
only include items within the Division's definition of the "Sears exception".
Moreover, there is no ambiguity in the use of the term as presently written
under the statute. Respondent attempts to assert that there is some ambiguity
because the same does not meet within their regulatory scheme.

However,

Appellant asserts that it was never intended for the Division to require those
engaged in the sale or merchandising of personal property that by
its design or manufacture may be attached, installed or otherwise affixed to real
property and who contract with persons, firms or corporations licensed under the
Chapter for installation to be so regulated.
More appropriately, Appellant contends that his business comes under the
regulatory scheme of Chapter 56, the Uniform Building Standards Act, in which he
is clearly defined as a "modular unit" and subject to the regulatory requirements of
the Chapter but which noticeably do not expressly require that he be licensed in the
construction trades as a contractor. Any other interpretation goes beyond the plain
meaning of the various statutes and by so doing creates ambiguity and confusion in
its interpretation.
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In order for the statute in this case to be ambiguous, it must provide different
meanings to reasonably well informed persons. See Keams-Tribune Corp. v.
Hornak. 917 P.2d 79 (Ut App. 1996). While testimony was taken in the instant case,
the representative of the Division that testified, ED L. SHORT, attempted to create
ambiguity where there was none by asserting that Appellant's product did not qualify
under the exemption because it was not a structure which is titled by the Utah
Department of Motor Vehicles. In pertinent part he stated:
(Jackson)

Q:

But again that's your interpretation of it
notwithstanding the personal property exemption?

(Mr. Short) A:

If you read the personal property exemption that I
think you alluded to earlier when you passed out the
information, you said where "personal property" is.
It talks about it, and I think you can read it there out
of the Rules.

Q:

The Rules you are referring to is in that stack, which
is Rule 156, is part of the Administrative Rule; is
that correct?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And they define "personal property"?

A:

Yes, they do.

Q:

"Personal property" to mean as it relates to Title 58,
56, factory built housing and modular construction,
a structure which is titled by the Department of
Motor Vehicles, State of Utah and taxed as personal
property?
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A:

Right. The modular housing that Mr. BOHNE
builds, to my knowledge, is not issued a Title
because it is exempt from titling requirements by
motor vehicles under 41-1a.

Q:

Well, you are saying that - -

A:

It does not, therefore meet that criteria.

Q:

You are saying that the entire interpretation of
"personal property - -

A:

May be flawed. What it basically says is that, if I
build personal property, whether it be a
manufactured home, it has to be titled by Motor
Vehicles.
Mr. BOHNE's product, to my knowledge, it not titled
by Motor Vehicles. They exclude it from titling by
Motor Vehicles.

Q:

So even though he has no legal requirement to title
the vehicles, you're saying that the only way that
this property becomes personal property is if he
goes out and titles it notwithstanding the law that
exempts him from titling the property?

A:

Yes, sir, because "personal property" says "...and
titled by Motor Vehicles."

The Appellant asserts that Mr. SHORT's interpretation of the provision does
not even conform with the idea that the personal property exemption is only there to
provide for the "Sears exception," since Sears products such as air conditioners,
refrigerators, coolers, stoves, sinks, tables, etc., are not licensed with the
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Department of Motor Vehicles. Mr. SHORT's explanation is not only confusing it is
nonsensical in its application. If it had been the attempt of the legislature to limit the
exemption as Mr. SHORT suggests, they could have done so by not using the term
personal property but some other term such as "sears exception" and then chose to
define the limits of such term and the use of the exemption. However, the legislature
chose not to do so and in fact chose to use the term "personal property" as the basis
for the exemption and then left the terms undefined statutorily for allowance of its
common usage and understanding to apply. The qualifying portion of the exemption
comes in the language concerning attachment which must be by one licensed as a
contractor or who would otherwise qualify for a different exemption. While the
rationale of Judge Thorne regarding this qualifying point is well taken, the Appellant
contends that the burden of proof issue is misleading. The evidence before the
Court is found in the stipulated statement of facts at paragraph 2 of Appellant's Brief
or paragraph 3 of the stipulated facts in the record at page 86. It states that the units
are sold to a licensed contractor or home owner, thus, qualifying for the personal
property exemption of 305(6), or homeowner's exemption of 305(5) noncommercial,
nonpublic use exemption. In short, a sale of a modular unit, constructed off site to
///
///
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either a licensed contractor or a homeowner qualifies for exemption under Section
305. Judge Thome erred in creating an unnecessary and misleading standard for
qualification of the exemption.
In light of all that has been misapplied or misconstrued and the confusing
basis for interpretation in the context of a criminal case, one point is clear and that
is that the Appellant was conducting himself in the same way he had in his business
for nearly thirty (30) years except to discontinue his contractor's license when he no
longer became involved in setting up the units or excavating the site and it has been
the Division's enforcement practices that have expanded to attempt to make
Appellant's long standing business practice now illegal. The consequence of the
Court of Appeals attempt to uphold this enforcement practice has effectively done
what Judge Thome predicted in making the personal property exemption nugatory.
CONCLUSION:
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, Appellant, LARRY G.
BOHNE, prays that relief be granted by reversing the Court of Appeals decision and
the Trial Court's Judgment Sentence, Stay of Execution, Order of Probation and
Certificate of Probably Cause in declaring that the personal property exemption
language of Subsection 6, Section 305, Chapter 55, Title 58,1953, as amended, be
interpreted pursuant to its plain and common meaning and not limited to the
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interpretation rendered but restricted by the Division of Professional Licensing of the
State of Utah together with such other and further relief as to the Utah Supreme
Court appears equitable and proper.
DATED this

day of

, 20.

J. BRYAN JACKSbKl
Attorney for Appellant Bohne
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ADDENDUM A

JUDICIAL CODE

521

Section
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed.
78-2-2.
Supreme Court jurisdiction.
78-2-3.
Repealed.
78-2-4.
Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tempore, and practice of law.
78-2-5
Repealed.
78-2-6.
Appellate court administrator.
78-2-7.
Repealed.
78-2-7.5.
Service of sheriff to court.
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed.
78-2-1. N u m b e r of j u s t i c e s — Terms — Chief j u s t i c e
a n d a s s o c i a t e chief j u s t i c e — S e l e c t i o n a n d
functions.
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices.
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed
initially to serve until the first general election held more than
three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten
years and commences on the first Mondav in J a n u a r y following the date of election. A justice whose term expires may
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is
appointed and qualified.
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief
justice from among the members of the court by a majority
vote of all justices. The term of the office of chief justice is four
years. The chief justice may serve successive terms. The chief
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all
justices of the Supreme Court.
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30
days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall
ait as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this
section. If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section.
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by
law.
(6) There is created the office of asset iate chief justice. The
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years. The
associate chief justice may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall be
elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice.
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate
diief justice as consistent with law.
i«90
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6.

Repealed.

1971, IORI

78-2-2. S u p r e m e Court j u r i s d i c t i o n .
(1) The Supreme Court has original juiisdiction to answer
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments,
and decrees or in'aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) coses certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative
proceedings originating with:
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U) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer;'or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record
holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any couit of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction
of a first degree or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction: and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments,
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction, except:
'a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a
capn I felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a)
through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under
Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the roquiremen'
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
1996
78-2-3.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-4.

S u p r e m e Court — R u l e m a k i n g , j u d g e s pro tempore, and practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
of the Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution,
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties.
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States,
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law.
1986
78-2-5.

Repealed.

1988

78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and
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(ii) demonstrate his own financial responsibility;
and
(iii) pass the required examination and meet all
other requirements of this chapter,
(b) A business entity shall:
(\) suhmit t h e a$$UcaUoi\ u\ the tuuue of and on
\>enaYi cfi foe W s \ n e s s entily,
(ii) list the individual as the qualifier;
(iii) demonstrate financial responsibility of the
business entity if applying for a contractor's license;
(iv) provide evidence that the individual qualifier
has passed the required examination; and
(v) meet all other requirements of this chapter.
,j) A person acting as a qualifier for a business entity
j. ^see must demonstrate to the division that he is an owner,
-.^r, or manager within that business entity who exercises
^rial authority in the conduct of that business entity's
^acting business by:
(a) making substantive technical and administrative
decisions relating to the work performed for which a
license is required under this chapter;
(b) hiring, promoting, transferring, laying off, disciplining, directing, or discharging employees of the licensee
either by himself or through others; and
(c) not being involved in any other employment or
activity which conflicts with his duties and responsibilities to ensure the licensee's performance of work regulated under this chapter does not jeopardize the public
health, safety, and welfare.
<L\ It is the duty and responsibility of the licensee and the
'jifier to comply with the provisions of this section. Failure
**.fOmply with the requirements of this section may be
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(4) sole owners of property engaged in building:
(a) no more than two residential structures per
year on their property for their own noncommercial,
nonpublic use that the owner lives in for at least
three months; except, any / person other than the
property owner or individuals described in Subsection (5) who engages in building the structure must
be licensed under this chapter if he is otherwise
required to be licensed under this chapter; or
(b) structures on their property for their own noncommercial, nonpublic use which are incidental to a
residential structure on the property, including
sheds, carports, or detached garages;
(5) (a) an individual engaged in construction or renovation of a residential building for noncommercial,
nonpublic use if that person:
(i) works without compensation other than
token compensation t h a t is not considered salary
or wages; and
(ii) works under the direction of the property
owner who engages in building the structure;
(b) for purposes of Subsection (5), "token compensation" means compensation paid by a sole owner of
property exempted from licensure under Subsection
(4) to an individual exempted from licensure under
Subsection (5), that is:
(i) minimal in value when compared with the
fair market value of the services provided by the
individual;
(ii) not related to the fair market value of the
services provided by the individual; and

tSP'

or both.
j6) If an individual qualifying on behalf of a business entity
-tjed a license under this chapter ceases association with
l^t entity as required in Subsection (4), the licensee shall
j(jly the division in writing within ten days after cessation of
^ociation or employment. If notice is given, the license shall
JJpain in force for 60 days after the date of cessation of
gelation or employment. The licensee shall replace the
^jginal qualifier with another individual qualifier within the
gCiay period or the license shall be automatically suspended.
0) Failure to notify the division of cessation of association
^piployment of a qualifier as required in Subsection (6) may
^ j l t i n immediate suspension of the license upon a finding of
^$5-305. E x e m p t i o n s from l i c e n s u r e .
fj0 addition to the exemptions from licensure in Section
"1-307, the following persons may engage in acts or pracincluded within the practice of construction trades subto the stated circumstances and limitations without being
under this chapter:
(1) an authorized representative of the United States
government or an authorized employee of the state or any
of its political subdivisions when working on construction
work of the state or the subdivision, and when acting
within the terms of his trust, office, or employment;
dental to the construction and repair of irrigation and
drainage ditches of regularly constituted irrigation districts, reclamation districts, and drainage districts or
Construction and repair relating to farming, dairying,
Igriculture, livestock or poultry raising, metal and coal
mining, quarries, sand and gravel excavations, well drilling, hauling to and from construction sites, and lumbering;
(3) public utilities operating under the rules of the
Public Service Commission on construction work inciden|al to their own business;

individual including paying for or providing
meals or refreshment while services are being
provided, or paying reasonable transportation
costs incurred by the individual in travel to the
site of construction;
(6) a person engaged in the sale or merchandising of
personal property that by its design or manufacture may
\)C attached, installed, or otherwise affixed to real property who has contracted with a person, firm, or corporation licensed under this chapter to install, affix, or attach
that property;
(7) a contractor submitting a bid on a federal aid
jiighway project, if, before undertaking any construction
^nder t h a t bid, the contractor is licensed under this
chapter;
(8) (a) a person engaged in the alteration, repair, remodeling, or addition to or improvement of any building with a contracted or agreed value of less than
$1,000, including both labor and materials, and including all changes or additions to the contracted or
agreed upon work;
(b) notwithstanding Subsection (8)(a), work in the
plumbing and electrical trades must be performed by
a licensed electrician or plumber except as otherwise
provided in this section;
tion or construction trade which is not classified by i ule by
the director as significantly impacting the public's health,
safety, and welfare;
(10) owners and lessees of property and persons regularly employed for wages by owners or lessees of property
or their agents for the purpose of maintaining the property, are exempt from this chapter when doing work upon
the property;
(11) (a) a person engaged in minor plumbing work
incidental to the replacement or repair of a fixture or
an appliance in a residential or small commercial

OCCUPATIONS AN D PROFESSIONS

58-55-301

(iii) one member shall be from the public at large
with no history of involvement in the construction
trades or union affiliation.
(2) The boards shall be appointed and serve in accordance
with Section 58-1-201.
(3\ Tl\o, duties &*vdre&^v&&v.lvt\ft&QC U\a boatds skall he. uv
accordance with Sections 58-1-202 and 58-1-203.
2000
PART 3
LICENSING
58-55-301. L i c e n s e r e q u i r e d — L i c e n s e classifications.
(1) (a) Any person engaged in the construction trades licensed under this chapter, as a contractor regulated
under this chapter, as an alarm business or company, or
as an alarm company agent, shall become licensed under
this chapter before engaging in that trade or contracting
activity in this state unless specifically exempted from
licensure under Section 58-1-307 or 58-55-305.
(b) The license issued under this chapter and the
business license issued by the local jurisdiction in which
the licensee has its principal place of business shall be the
only licenses required for the licensee to engage in a trade
licensed by this chapter, within the state.
(c) Neither the state nor any of its political subdivisions
may require of a licensee any additional business licenses,
registrations, certifications, contributions, donations, or
anything else established for the purpose of qualifying a
licensee under this chapter to do business in that local
jurisdiction, except for contract prequalification procedures required by state a^eueies^ or t h e payment Qf any
Too f>r the license, registration, or certification established as a condition to do business in t h a t local jurisdiction.
(2) The division shall issue licenses under this chapter to
qualified persons in the following classifications:
(a) general engineering contractor;
(b) general building contractor;
(c) residential and small commercial contractor;
(d) specialty contractor;
(e) journeyman plumber;
(f) apprentice plumber;
(g) residential journeyman plumber;
(h) residential apprentice plumber;
(i) master electrician;
(j) residential master electrician;
(k) journeyman electrician;
(1) residential journeyman electrician;
(m) apprentice electrician;
(n) construction trades instructor:
(i) general engineering classification;
(ii) general building classification;
(iii) electrical classification;
(iv) plumbing classification; and
(v) mechanical classification;
(o) alarm company; and
(p) alarm company agent.
V^) h n appYicant may app\y SOT a Yicense in one or moTe
classification or specialty contractor subclassification. A license shall be granted in each classification or subclassification for which the applicant qualifies. A separate application
and fee must be submitted for each license classification or
subclassification.
2000
58-55-302. Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s for l i c e n s u r e .
(1) Each applicant for a license under this chapter shall:
(a) submit an application prescribed by the division;
(b) pay a fee as determined by the department under
Section 63-38-3.2;
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(c) (i) meet the examination requirements established
by rule by the division in collaboration with the
appropriate board, except for the classifications of
apprentice plumber, residential apprentice plumber,
and apprentice electrician for whom no examination
is required; or
'
(ii) the individual qualifier must pass the required
examination if the applicant is a business entity;
(d) if an apprentice, identify the proposed supervisor of
the apprenticeship;
(e) if an applicant for a contractor's license:
(i) produce satisfactory evidence of financial responsibility, except for construction trades instructor
for whom evidence of financial responsibility is not
required;
(ii) produce satisfactory evidence of knowledge and
experience in the construction industry and knowledge of the principles of the conduct of business as a
contractor, reasonably necessary for the protection of
the public health, safety, and welfare; and
(iii) be a licensed master electrician if an applicant
for an electrical contractor's license or a licensed
master residential electrician if an applicant for a
residential electrical contractor's license; or
(iv) be a journeyman plumber or residential journeyman plumber if an applicant for a plumbing
contractor's license; and
(f) if an applicant for a construction trades instructor
license, satisfy any additional requirements established
by rule.
(2) After approval of an applicant for a contractor's license
following with the division before the division issues the
license:
(a) proof of workers' compensation insurance which
covers employees of the applicant in accordance with
applicable Utah law;
(b) proof of public liability insurance in coverage
amounts and form established by rule except for a construction trades instructor for whom public liability insurance is not required; and
(c) proof of registration as required by applicable law
with the:
(i) Utah Department of Commerce;
(ii) Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code;
(iii) Division of Workforce Information and Payment Services in the Department of Workforce Services, for purposes of Title 35A, Chapter 4, Employment Security Act;
(iv) State Tax Commission; and
(v) Internal Revenue Service.
(3) In addition to the general requirements for each applicant in Subsection (1), applicants shall comply with the
following requirements to be licensed in the following classifications:
(a) A journeyman plumber applicant shall produce:
the equivalent of at least four years of full-time
training and instruction as a licensed apprentice
plumber under supervision of a licensed journeyman
plumber and in accordance with a planned program
of training approved by the division;
(ii) satisfactory evidence of at least eight years of
full-time experience approved by the division in collaboration with the Plumbers Licensing Board; or
(iii) satisfactory evidence of meeting the qualifications determined by the division nr 1 board to be
equivalent to Subsection (3)(a)(i) or (a;Ui).
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58-56-1. S h o r t title.
This chapter is known as the "Utah Unifqrm Building
Standards Act."
1989
58-56-2. C h a p t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
The provisions of this chapter shall be administered by the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing.
1989
58-56-3. Definitions.
In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102, as used in
this chapter:
(1) u ANSl M means American National Standards Institute, Inc.
(2) "Codo(sT means the NEC, building code, mechanical code, or plumbing code as defined in this section and as
applied in context.
(3) "Commission"' means the Uniform Building Code
Commission created under this chapter.
(4) "Compliance agency" means an agency of the state
or any of its political subdivisions which issue permits for
construction regulated under the codes, or any other
agency of the state or its political subdivisions specifically
empowered to enforce compliance with the codes.
(5) "Factory built housing" means manufactured homes
or mobile homes.
(6) "Factory built housing set-up contractor" means an
individual licensed by the division to set up or install
factory built housing on a temporary or permanent basis.
The scope of the work included under the license includes
the placement and or securing of the factory built housing
on a permanent or temporary foundation, securing the
units together if required, and connection of the utilities
to the factory built housing unit, but does not include site
preparation, construction of a permanent foundation, and
construction of utility services to the near proximity of the
factory built housing unit. If a dealer is not licenced as a
factory built housing set up contractor, that individual
must subcontract the connection services to individuals
who are licensed by the division to perform those specific
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functions under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction
Trades Licensing Act.
(7) "HUD code" means the Fedeial Manufactured
Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act.
(8) "Installation standard" means the standard
adopted and published by the National Conference of
States on Building Codes and Standards (NCSBCS), for
the installation of manufactured homes titled "The Standard for fJanufactured Home Installations," the accompanying manufacturer's instructions for the installation of
the manufactured home, or such equivalent standard as
adopted by rule.
(9) "Local regulator" means earn political subdivision
of the state which is empowered to engage in the regulation of construction, alteration, remodeling, building, repair, and other activities subject to the codes adopted
pursuant to this chapter.
(10) "Manufactured home" means a transportable factory built housing unit constructed on or afUr J u n e 15,
1976, according to the Federal Home Construction and
Safety Standards Act of 1974 (HUD Code), in erne or more
sections, which, in the traveling mode, is eight body feet
or more in width or 40 body feet or more in length, or
when erected on site, is 400 or more square feet, and
which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be
used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes
the plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical
systems. All manufactured homes constructed on or after
J u n e 15, 1976, shall be identifiable by the manufacturer's
data plate bearing the date the unit was manufactured
and a HUD label attached to the exterior of the home
certifying the home was manufactured to HUD standards.
(11) "Mobile home" means a transportable factory built
housing unit built prior to J u n e 15, 1976, in accordance
with a state mobile home code which existed prior to the
Federal Manufactured Housing and Safety Standaids Act
(HUD Code).
(12) "Modular unit" means a structure built from sections which are manufactured in accordance with the
construction standards adopted pursuant to Section 5856-4 and transported to a building site, the purpose of
which is for h u m a n habitation, occupancy, or use.
(13) "NEC" means the National Electrical Code
(14) "Opinion" means a written, nonbinding, and advisory statement issued by the commission concerning an
interpretation of the meaning of the codes or the application of the codes in a specific circumstance issued in
response to a specific request by a party to the issue.
(15) "State regulator" means an agency of the state
which is empowered to engage in the regulation of construction, alteration, remodeling, building, repair, and
other activities subject to the codes adopted pursuant to
this chapter.
(16) "Unlawful conduct" is as defined in Subsection
58-1-501(1) and includes:
(a) engaging in the sale of factory built housing
without being registered with the division as a dealer,
unless the sale is exempt under Section 58-56-16; and
(b) selling factory built housing within the state as
a dealer without collecting and remitting to the
division the fee required by Section 58-56-17.
(17) "Unprofessional conduct" is as defined in Subsection 58-1-501(2) and includes:
(a) any nondelivery of goods or services by a registered dealer which constitutes a breach of contract by
the dealer;
(b) the failure of a registered dealer to pay a
subcontractor or supplier any amounts to which that
subcontractor or supplier is legally entitled; and
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GENERAL PROVISIONS
5845-101. S h o r t title.
This chapter is known as the "Utah Construction Trades
Licensing Act."
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58-55-102. D e f i n i t i o n s .
In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102, as used in
this chapter:
(1) (a) "Alarm business or company" means a person
engaged in the sale, installation, piaintenance, alteration, repair, replacement, servicing, or monitoring of
an alarm system.
(b) ."Alarm business or company" does not include
the activities of:
(i) a person engaged in the manufacture and
sale of alarm systems when that person is not
engaged in the installation, maintenance, alteration, repair, replacement, servicing, or monitoring of alarm systems, and the manufacture or
sale occurs only at a place of business established
by the person engaged in the manufacture or sale
and does not involve site visits at the place or
intended place of installation of an alarm system;
Or
(ii) an owner of an alarm system, or an employee of the owner of an alarm system who is
engaged in installation, maintenance, alteration,
repair, replacement, servicing, or monitoring of
the alarm system owned by that owner.
(2) "Alarm company agent" means any individual employed within this state by a person engaged in the alarm
business.
(3) "Alarm system" means equipment and devices assembled for the purpose of:
(a) detecting and signaling unauthorized intrusion
or entry into or onto certain premises; or
(b) signaling a robbery or attempted robbery on
protected premises.
(4) "Apprentice electrician" means a person licensed
under this chapter as an apprentice electrician who is
learning the electrical trade under approved supervision
of a master electrician, residential master electrician, a
journeyman electrician, or a residential journeyman electrician.
(5) "Apprentice plumber" means a person licensed under this chapter as an apprentice plumber who is learning
the plumbing trade under approved supervision of a
journeyman plumber.
(6) "Approved supervision" means the immediate supervision of apprentices by qualified licensed electricians
or plumbers as a part of a planned program of training.
(7) "Board" means the Contractors Licensing Board,
Electrician Licensing Board, Alarm System Security and
Licensing Board, or Plumbers Licensing Board created in
Section 58-55-201.
, (8) "Construction trade" means any trade or occupation
involving construction, alteration, remodeling, repairing,
wrecking or demolition, addition to, or improvement of
any building, highway, road, railroad, dam, bridge, structure, excavation or other project, development, or improvement to other than personal property.
(9) "Construction trades instructor" means a person
licensed under this chapter to teach one or more construction trades in both a classroom and project environment,
where a project is intended for sale to or use by the public
and is completed under the direction of an instructor who
has no economic interest in the project.
(10) (a) "Contractor" means any person who for compensation other than wages as an employee undertakes any work in the construction, plumbing, or
electrical trade for which licensure is required under
this chapter and includes:
(i) a person who builds any structure on his
own property for the purpose of sale or who
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58-5G-1. S h o r t t i t l e .
This chapter is known as the "Utah Uniform Building
Standards Act."
1989
58-56-2. C h a p t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
The provisions of this chapter shall be administered by the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing.
1989
58-56-3. D e f i n i t i o n s .
In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102, as used in
this chapter:
(1) "ANSI" means American National Standards Institute, Inc.
(2) "Code(s)" means the NEC, building code, mechanical code, or plumbing code as defined in this section and as
applied in context.
(3) "Commission" means the Uniform Building Code
Commission created under this chapter.
(4) "Compliance agency" means an agency of the state
or any of its political subdivisions which issue permits for
construction regulated under the codes, or any other
agency of the state or its political subdivisions specifically
empowered to enforce compliance with the codes.
(5) "Factory built housing" means manufactured homes
or mobile homes.
(6) "Factory built housing set-up contractor" means an
individual licensed by the division to set up or install
factory built housing on a temporary or permanent basis.
The scope of the work included under the license includes
the placement and or securing of the factory built housing
on a permanent or temporary foundation, securing the
units together if required, and connection of the utilities
to the factory built housing unit, but does not include site
preparation, construction of a permanent foundation, and
construction of utility services to the near proximity of the
factory built housing unit. If a dealer is not licensed as a
factory built housing set up contractor, that individual
must subcontract the connection services to individuals
who are licensed by the division to perform those specific
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functions under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction
Trades Licensing Act.
(7) "HUD code" means the Federal Manufactured
Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act.
(8) "Installation standard" means the standard
adopted and published by the National Conference of
States on Building Codes and Standards (NCSBCS), for
the installation of manufactured homes titled "The Standard for Manufactured Home Installations," the accompanying manufacturer's instructions for the installation of
the manufactured home, or such equivalent standard as
adopted by rule.,
(9) "Local regulator" means each political subdivision
of the state which is empowered to engage in the regulation of construction, alteration, remodeling, building, repair, and other activities subject to the codes adopted
pursuant to thi<* chapter.
(10) "Manufactured home" means a transportable factory built housing unit constructed on or after J u n e 15,
1976, according to the Federal Home Construction and
Safety Standards Act of 1974 (HUD Code), in one1 or more
sections, which, in the traveling mode, is eight body feet
or more in width or 40 body feet or more in length, or
when erected on site, is 400 or more square feet, and
which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be
used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes
the plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical
systems. All manufactured homes constructed on or after
J u n e 15, 1976, shall be identifiable by the manufacturer's
data plate bearing the date the unit was manufactured
and a HUD label attached to the exterior of the home
certifying the home was manufactured to HUD standards.
(11) "Mobile home" means a transportable factory built
housing unit built prior to J u n e 15, 1976, in accordance
with a state mobile home code which existed prior to the
Federal Manufactured Housing and Safety Standards Act
(HUD Code).
(12) "Modular unit" means a structure built from sections which are manufactured in accordance with the
construction standards adopted pursuant to Section 5856-4 and transported to a building site, the purpose of
which is for h u m a n habitation, occupancy, or use.
(13) "NEC" means the National Electrical Code.
(14) "Opinion" means a written, nonbinding, and advisory statement issued by the commission concerning an
interpretation of the meaning of the codes or the application of the codes in a specific circumstance issued in
response to a specific request by a party to the issue.
(15) "State regulator" means an agency of the state
which is empowered to engage in the regulation of con*,
struction, alteration, remodeling, building, repair, and
other activities subject to the codes adopted pursuant to
this chapter.
(16) "Unlawful conduct" is as defined in Subsection
58-1-501(1) and includes:
(a) engaging in the sale of factory built housing
without being registered with the division as a dealer,
unless the sale is exempt under Section 58-56-16; and
(b) selling factory built housing within the state as
a dealer without collecting and remitting to the
division the fee required by Section 58-56-17.
(17) "Unprofessional conduct" is as defined in Subsection 58-1-501(2) and includes:
(a) any nondelivery of goods or services by a registered dealer which constitutes a breach of contract by
the dealer;
(b) the failure of a registered dealer to pay a
subcontractor or supplier any amounts to which that
subcontractor or supplier is legally entitled; and
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(c) any other activity whirh is defined as unprofessional conduct by division rule in accordance wi*h the
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
2000

58-56-4. Definitions — Adoption of b u i l d i n g c o d e s —
Amendments — Exemptions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "agricultural use" means a use that relates to the
tilling of soil and raising of crops, or keeping or raising
domestic animals, for the purpose of commercial food
production;
(b) "not for h u m a n occupancy" means use of a structure
for purposes other than protection or comfort of human
beings, but allows people to enter the structure for:
(i) maintenance and repair; and
(ii) the care of livestock, crops, or equipment intended for agricultural use which are kept there; and
(c) "residential area" means land that is not used for an
agricultural use and is:
(i) (A) within the boundaries of a city or town; and
(B) less than five contiguous acres;
(ii) (A) within a subdivision for which the county
has approved a subdivision plat under Title 17,
Chapter 27, Part 8, Subdivision; and
(B) less than two contiguous acres; or
(iii) not located in whole or in p a i t in an agricultural protection area created under Title 17, Chapter
41, Agricultural Protection Area.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsections (4) and (5), the
following are adopted as the construction standards to which
the state and each political subdivision of this state shall
adhere in building construction, alteration, remodeling and
repair, and in the regulation of building construction, alteration, remodeling and repair:
(a) a building code promulgated by a nationally recognized code authority;
(b) the National Electrical Code promulgated by the
National Fire Protection Association;
(c) a plumbing code adopted by a nationally recognized
code authority; and
(d) a mechanical code promulgated by a nationally
recognized code authority.
(3) The division, in collaboration with the commission, shall
adopt by rule the edition of the NEC or code and specific
edition of the codes described in Subsections (2)(a), (c), and (d)
to be used as the standard and may adopt by rule successor
editions of any adopted code.
(4) The division, in collaboration with the commission, may
adopt amendments to the adopted codes to be applicable to the
entire state or within a political subdivision only in accordance
with Section 58-56-7.
(5) (a) Except in a residential area, a structure used solely
in conjunction with agriculture use, and not for h u m a n
occupancy, is exempted from the permit requirements of
any building code adopted by the division.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), unless otherwise exempted, plumbing, electrical, and mechanical permits may be required when t h a t work is included in the
structure.
1998

58-56-5. Building Code Commission — Composition of
commission — Commission duties and responsibilities.
(1) There is established a Uniform Building Code Commislion to advise the division with respect to the division's
responsibilities in administering the codes under this chapter.
(2) The commission shall be appointed by the executive
director who shall submit his nominations to the governor for
confirmation or rejection. If a nominee is rejected, alternative
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names shall be submitted until confirmation is received.
Following confirmation by the governor, the appointment shall
be made.
(3) The commission shall consist of eleven members who
shall be appointed in accordance with the following:
(a) one member shall be from among candidates nominated by the Utah League of Cities and Towns and the
Utah Association of Counties;
(b) one member shall be a licensed building inspector
employed by a political subdivision of the state;
(c) one member shall be a licensed professional engineer;
(d) one member shall be a licensed architect;
(e) one member shall be a fire official;
(f) three members shall be contractors licensed by the
state, of which one shall be a general contractor, one an
electrical contractor, and one a plumbing contractor;
(g) two members shall be from the (general public and
have no affiliation with the construction industry or real
estate development industry; and
(h) one member shall be from the Division of Facilities
Construction Management, Department of Administrative Services.
(4) (a) Except as required by Subsection (4)(h), as terms of
current commission members expire, the executive director shall appoint each new member or reappointed member to a four-year term.
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection
(4)(a), the executive director shall, at the time of appointment or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to
ensuie that the terms of commission members are staggered so that approximately half of the commission is
appointed every two years.
(5) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired
term.
(6) No commission member may serve more than two full
terms, and no commission member who ceases to serve may
again serve on the commission until after the expiration of two
years from the date of cessation of service.
(7) A majotity of the commission members shall constitute
a quorum and may act on behalf of the commission.
(8) (a) (i) Members who are not government employees
shall receive no compensation or benefits for their
services, but may receive per diem and expenses
incurred in the performance of the member's official
duties at the rates established by the Division of
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and
expenses for their service.
(b) (i) State government officer and employee members
who do not receive salary, per diem, or expenses from
their agency for their service may receive per diem
and expenses incurred in the performance of their
official duties from the commission at the rates established by the Division of Finance under Sections
63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(ii) State government officer and employee members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for
their service.
(c) (i) Local government members who do not receive
salary, per diem, or expenses from the entity that
they represent for their service may receive per diem
and expenses incurred in the performance of their
official duties at the rates established by the Division
of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(ii) Local government members may decline to
receive per diem and expenses for their service.
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(9) The commission shall annually designate one of its
members to serve as chair of the commission. The division
shall provide a secretary to facilitate the function of the
commission and to record its actions and recommendations.
(10) The duties and responsibilities of the commission are
to:
(a) recommend to the director the adoption by rule of
the edition of the NEC, and the specific codes and editions
of the codes described in Subsections 58-56-4(2)(a), (c) and
(d) adopted pursuant to this chapter;
(b) recommend to the director the adoption by rule of
amendments to the NEC, the building code, the mechanical code, and plumbing code adopted pursuant to this
chapter;
(c) offer an opinion regarding the interpretation of or
the application of any of the codes adopted pursuant to
this chapter upon a formal submission by a party to the
matter in question which submission must clearly state
the facts in question, the specific code citation involved
and the position taken by all parties;
(d) act as an appeals board as provided in Subsection
58-56-8(3);
(e) establish advisory peer committees on either a
standing or ad hoc basis to advise the commission with
respect to building code matters, including a committee to
advise the commission regarding health matters related
to the UFC; and
(f) assist the division in overseeing code related training in accordance with Section 58-56-9.
1998
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B u i l d i n g c o d e s — D i v i s i o n d u t i e s a n d responsibilities.
(1) The division shall administer the adoption and amendment of the NEC, the building code, the mechanical code, and
the plumbing code adopted under Section 58-5(J-/t pursuant to
this chapter; but, shall have no responsibility or duty to
conduct inspections to determine compliance with the codes,
issue permits, or assess building permit fees.
(2) Administration of the NEC, the building code, the
mechanical code, and the plumbing code adopted under Section 58-56-4 by the division shall include:
(a) receiving recommendations from the commission
and thereafter adopting by rule the editions of the codes
and amendments to the codes;
(b) maintaining and publishing for reference on a current basis the editions of the code in force and amendments thereto; and
(c) receiving requests for amendments and opinions
from the commission, scheduling appropriate hearings
and publishing the amendments to the codes and the
opinions of the commission with respect to interpretation
and application of the codes.
1995
58-56-7.

Code a m e n d m e n t s — C o m m i s s i o n r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s — D i v i s i o n d u t i e s a n d responsibilities.
(1) The division, with the commission, shall establish by
rule the procedure and manner under which requests for
amendments to codes shall be:
(a) filed with the division; and
(b) recommended or declined for adoption.
(2) The division shall accept from any local regulators, state
regulators, state agencies involved with the construction and
design of buildings, the contractors, plumbers, or electricians
licensing boards, or from recognized construction-related associations a request for amendment to the NEC, the building
code, the mechanical code, or the plumbing code adopted
under Section 58-56-4.
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(3) The division or the commission on its own initiative may
make recommendations to the commission for amendment to
the NEC, the building code, the mechanical code, or the
plumbing code adopted under Section 58-56-4.
(4) On May 15 and November 15 of each calendar year, or
the first government working day thereafter if cither date falls
on a weekend or government holiday, the division shall convene a public hearing, as a part of the rulemaking process,
before the commission concerning requests for amendment of
the codes, recommended by the division and comniission to be
adopted by rule. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance
with the rules of t h e commission.
(5) Within 15 days following completion of the hearing
under Subsection (4) or (5), the commission shall provide to
the division a written recommendation concerning each
amendment.
(6) The division shall consider the recommendations and
promulgate amendments by rule in accordance w,ith Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act and as
prescribed by the director.
(7) The decision of the division to accept or reject the
recommendation of the commission shall be made within 15
days after receipt of the recommendation.
(8) All decisions of the division pertaining to adoption of a
code edition or amendments to any code, which are contrary to
recommendations of the commission, may be overridden by a
two-thirds vote of the commission according to a procedure to
be established by rule.
(9) (a) Amendments with statewide application:
(i) shall be effective on the J a n u a r y 1 or July 1
immediately following the public hearing; or
(ii) may be effective prior to the dates in Subsection (i) if designated by the division and, the commission as necessary for the public health, safety, and
welfare.
(b) Amendments with local application only shall be
effective on a date to be determined by the division and
the commission.
(c) In making rules required by this chapter, the division shall comply with the provisions of Title 63, Chapter
46a, Administrative Rulemaking Act, the provisions of
t h a t chapter shall have control over this section in case of
any conflict.
1998
58-56-8.

C o m p l i a n c e w i t h c o d e s — Responsibility for
i n s p e c t i o n s — Appeals.
(1) The responsibility for inspection of construction projects
and enforcement of compliance with provisions of the codes
shall be with the compliance agency having jurisdiction over
the project and the applicable codes.
(2) A finding by a compliance agency t h a t a [licensed contractor, electrician, or plumber pas materially violated the
provisions of a code in a manner to jeopardise the public
health, safety, and welfare and failed to comply with corrective
orders of the compliance agency shall be furnished in writing
to the division by the compliance agency. It is the responsibility of the compliance agency to conduct a primary investigation to determine that, in fact, there has been a material
violation of the provisions of the code jeopardizing the public
interest and provide the report of investigation to the division.
(3) Each compliance agency shall establishj a method of
appeal by which a person disputing the application and
interpretation of a code may appeal and receive a timely
review of the disputed issues in accordance with provisions of
the National Electrical Code, the building code, the mechanical code, or the plumbing code adopted under Section 58-56-4.
If a compliance agency refuses to establish a method of appeal,
the commission shall act as the appeals board and conduct a
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58-56-14,

M o d i f i c a t i o n of f a c t o r y b u i l t h o u s i n g u n i t s
and modular units.
(1) Any modification to factory built housing units shall be
made in accordance with the following:
(a) Prior to set-up, modification to a manufactured
home or mobile home prior to installation or set-up of the
unit for na6i'£a£ion shad be made in accordance with the
HUD code.
(b) After set-up:
(i) modification to a manufactured home or mobile
home after installation or set-up of the unit for
habitation, which modification does not include the
addition of any space to the existing unit or the
attachment of any structure to the existing unit shall
be made in accordance with the HUD code; and
(ii) modification to a manufactured home or mobile
home after installation or set-up of the unit for
habitation, which modification includes the addition
of any space to the existing unit or the attachment of
any structure to the unit shall be made as follows:
(A) modifications to the existing unit shall be
in accordance with the HUD code; and
(B) additional structure outside of the existing
unit shall be in accordance with the Utah Uniform Building Standards Act.
(2) Any modification to modular housing units shall be
made in accordance with the Utah Uniform Building Standards Act.
1990
58-56-15.

Factory built housing and m o d u l a r units —
Division responsibility.
T h s division:
(1) shall maintain current files with respect to the
HUD code and amendments thereto with respect to
nianufactured homes and the "installation standard" defined in Section 58-56-3 with respect to installation of
factory built housing; and will provide at reasonable cost
such information to all compliance agencies, local regulators, or state regulators requesting such information;
(2) shall provide qualified personnel to advise compliance agencies, local regulators, and state regulators regarding the standards for construction and set-up, construction and set-up inspection, and additions or
inodifications to factory built housing;
(3) may regularly inspect the work of all factory built
housing manufacturers in the state during the construction process to determine compliance of the manufacturer
with the applicable standards of the HUD code or the
American National Standards Institute, Inc. or equivalent standards adopted by rule; and upon a finding of any
substantive deficiency furnish a written finding of such
deficiency to the standards agency;
(4) is hereby designated as the state administrative
agency and shall act as such for all purposes under the
provisions of the HUD code; and
(5) may inspect the work of all modular unit manufacturers in the state during the construction process to
determine compliance of the manufacturer with the Utah
Uniform Building Standard Act for those units to be
installed within the state; and upon a finding of any
substantive deficiency issue a corrective order to the
rrianufacturer with a copy to the local regulator in the
state's political subdivision in which the unit is to be
installed.
1990

58-56-16.

R e g i s t r a t i o n of d e a l e r s — B o n d i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s — R e n e w a l — E x e m p t i o n s — Discipline.
(1) Each person engaged in the sale of factory built housing
in the state, except as provided in Subsection (4), shall register
with the division as a dealer.
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(2) Each applicant for registration under this section shall:
(a) submit an application in a form prescribed by the
division;
(b) pay a fee determined by the department under
Section 63-38-3.2; and
(c) provide the division with *a registration bond in
Accordance with ru/es established by the division.
(3) (a) .The division shall iss^ie each registration under this
Section in accordance with a two-year renewal cycle
established by rule.
(b) The division may by rule extend or shorten a
renewal c^cle by as much as one year to stagger the
renewal cycles it administers.
(c) Each registration under this section automatically
expires on the expiration date on the certificate of registration unless the registrant renews it in accordance with
Section 58-1-308.
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a) a person not regularly engaged in thej sale of factory
built housing who is selling a unit he owns for his own
account;
(b) a principal broker licensed under Title 61, Chapter
2, Division of Real Estate; or
(c) a sales agent or associate broker licensed under
Title 61, Chapter 2, Division of Real Estate, who sells
factory built housing as an agent for, and under the
supervision, of the licensed principal broker with whom
he is affiliated.
(5) Grounds for refusing to issue a registration, for refusing
to renew a registration, for revoking, suspending, restricting,
or placing on probation a registration, for issuing a public or
private reprimand to a registrant, and for issuing a cease and
desist order shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-401.
1999

58-56-17. F e e s o n s a l e — E s c r o w a g e n t s — S a l e s tax.
O) Each dealer shall collect and remit a fee of $75 to the
division for each factory built home the dealer* sells that has
not b^cMi permanently affixed to real property. The fee shall be
payable within 30 days following the close of each calendar
quarter for all units sold during that calendar quarter. The fee
shall be deposited in a restricted account as provided in
Section 58-56-17.5.
(2) Any principal real estate broker, associate broker, or
sales agent exempt from registration as a dealer under Section
58-56-16 who sells a factory built home t h a t has not been
permanently affixed to real property shall close the sale only
through a qualified escrow agent in this state registered with
the Insurance Department or the Department of Financial
Institutions.
(3) Each escrow agent through which a sale is closed under
Subsection (2) shall remit all required sales tax to the state.
1999

58-5G-17.5. F a c t o r y B u i l t H o u s i n g F e e s R e s t r i c t e d Account.
(1) There is created within the General Fund a restricted
account known as "Factory Built Housing Fees Account."
(2) (a) The restricted account shall be funded from the fees
the dealer collects and remits to the division for each
factory built home the dealer sells as provided in Subsection 58-56-17(1).
(b) The division shall deposit all monies collected under
Subsection 58-56-17(1) in the restricted account.
(c) The restricted account shall be used to pay for
education and enforcement of the Uniform Building Standards Act, including investigations and administrative
actions and the funding of additional employees to the
amount of the legislative appropriation.
(d) The restricted account may accrue interest which
shall be deposited into the restricted account.
1997
58-56-18.

Repealed.
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ADDENDUM B

DAVID R. BRICKEY (#6188)
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801)586-6694
Telecopier: (801)586-2737
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

)

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY
OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE,
ORDER OF PROBATION AND
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE

vs.

)

LARRY G. BOHNE,

)

Criminal No. 971501320

)

Judge Robert T. Braithwaite

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter having come before the Court for a previously scheduled criminal
trial, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
David R. Brickey, and the Defendant LARRY G. BOHNE, appearing in person together with his
attorney of record, Bryan Jackson, and the Court thereafter hearing testimony both on June 16,1998,
and on June 24, 1998, and the Court thereafter entering an opinion that the Defendant was in fact
guilty, the Court thereafter ordering the County Attorney's Office to prepare a Judgement, Sentence,
Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and a Certificate of Probable Cause.
JUDGEMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, LARRY
G. BOHNE, having been found guilty to the offense of CONTRACTING WITHOUT A LICENSE,
a Class A Misdemeanor, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in

regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being
shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged arid convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, LARRY G. BOHNE, and pursuant to his
conviction of CONTRACTING WITHOUT A LICENSE, a Class A Misdemeanor, is hereby
sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Iron County Correctional Facility for a period of six (6)
months, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Iron County Correctional
Facility/Iron County Sheriff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDER that the Defendant, LARRY G. BOHNE, and pursuant to his
conviction of CONTRACTING WITHOUT A LICENSE, a Class A Misdemeanor, pay a fine in the
sum and amount of one-thousand dollars ($1,000).
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the term of imprisonment imposed and the
fine imposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and
compliance with the following terms and conditions of probation.
ORDER OF PROBATION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, LARRY
G. BOHNE, is hereby placed on bench probation for a period of twelve (12) months, under the
supervision of the Fifth District Court, strictly within the following terms, provisions, and
conditions:
1.

That the Defendant is oidered to obey all laws and terms and conditions of this

probation for the following twelve (12) months.
2.

That the Defendant is further ordered to not engage in the practice of contracting
-2UQS.j

without obtaining first a license from the Utah Department of Professional Licensing.
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
The Court having heard argument from both the Defendant and the Stale of Utah, hereby
enters the following findings of fact as pertinent and relevant to the Court of Appeals in determining
that this is appropriate for certification of probable cause pursuant to Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Rule 27. The substantial questions of law and fact are as follows to wit:
1.

The Court adopts the factual findings and stipulations agreed to by counsel for the

State of Utah and the Defendant. By this reference the Court incorporates them into this order.
2.

The Court finds that the home built by the defendant is a modular structure under 58-

56-312, Utah Code Annotated. It was constructed at one location and transported to another location
for attachment to a foundation. It is not a manufactured home under subsection 9, because it is not
HUD certified. It is not a mobile home because it did not have wheels or chassis.
3.

Section 58-55-301(a) UCA, requires persons engaged in the construction trade to be

licensed. The defendant by stipulation, did not have a license. The court determines that the
defendant's activities brought him under the requirements of this statute.
4.

The Court finds that the defendant engaged in the trade of general building contractor,

and residential small commercial contractor under section 58-55-301 (b)(2)(c) UCA. His activities
constituted those of a general contractor: overseeing the construction of the component parts of the
home that was transported, either doing the work himself, or lining up subcontractors to do work
such as the electrical or plumbing. The foundation structure was done by someone else, but the
home that was put on the structure was done by the defendant.
5.

The Court finds that the defendant does not meet the exceptions of 58-55-305(6)

UCA. Specifically, the court finds that the defendant did not sell personal property, that by its
-3-

design or manufacture may be installed on leal property. He sold a basically completed home fiom
the ground up, which then was attached to a foundation. The defendant did not just provide
materials, he fabricated or combined them into a completed product. Additionally, the court is
persuaded by the testimony presented by the state that this does not meet the "Sears exception" of
personal property such as an air conditioner. A more reasonable interpretation of the statute^hat it
is intended for personal property such as an air conditioner. To rule otherwise would allow the
exception to swallow the rule. Each general contractor and subcontractor could claim that they were
selling personal property, individual components such as pipe or electrical wire, etc., that ended up
being attached to the property.
6.

The court believes that the statutes imply a legislative public policy that homes be

built by a general contractor license by the Department of Professional Licensing. The court
recognizes there are exemptions, such as homeowner built homes, etc. but that the defendant does
not fit recognized exemption.
7.

The court heard from experts from both sides of the case with exact opposite opinions

of the requirements applying to the defendant and the facts in this case. While the court adopts a
position consistent with the Department of Commerce and the current state officials regarding the
statutes the court finds that this matter is appropriate for certification of probable cause pursuant to
the requirements of Rule 27 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

i
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ftroval as to Form:

B'4Y#N JA(&SON
Attorney for Defendant
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DATED this _9_

day of July, 1998.
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Mu'IU.
'
ROBERT T. BRA.ITHWAITE
District Court Judge
TIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF IRON )
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County,
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the original Judgment,
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Certificate of Probable Cause in
the case entitled State of Utah vs. Larry G. Bohne. Criminal No. 971501320, now on file and of
record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah,

this 3^

day of Wty, 1998.

CAROLYN BULLQHH
AROLYN BULLOCH
strict Court Clerk
( SEAL

)

i\ijyr-

Ub'KiY

eputy District Court Clerk
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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Paulette Stagg
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OPINION
(For Official Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20000350-CA
F I L E D
(January 11, 2001)

Larry G. Bohne,
Defendant and Appellant

[2001 UT App 11

Fifth District, Cedar City Department
The Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite
Attorneys:

J. Bryan Jackson, Cedar City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Salt
Lake City, and Scott Burns, Cedar City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Thorne.
BENCH, Judge:
Kl
Appellant Larry G. Bohne appeals from a conviction of
contracting without a license, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-501 (1997) . We affirm.
BACKGROUND
^2
Appellant builds and sells modular homes. Appellant is not
a licensed contractor, and does not use licensed subcontractors,
such as electricians or plumbers, in constructing the modular
homes. The modular homes are inspected, however, by a statelicensed inspector to insure compliance with the general uniform
building codes.
%3
Appellant generally sells the modular homes assembled as a
single unit, and transports them from his manufacturing facility
to installation sites by using a "low-boy" trailer. Appellant
never performs any site work, such as excavation, laying a
foundation, or installing utilities, nor does he actually install
or attach the modular buildings to a foundation. The buyers of
the homes bear all responsibility for site work and installation
of the modular buildings.

H4
On December 9, 1991, the State of Utah filed an Information
against Appellant alleging multiple counts of contracting without
a license, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-55-501 (1997) . Following a bench trial on one count, the
trial court entered a judgment of guilty, sentenced Appellant to
a six-month term of incarceration, and imposed a one-thousand
dollar fine. The trial court stayed execution of the sentence
and placed Appellant on twelve months bench probation, which
prohibited Appellant from constructing modular homes without
first obtaining a license from the Utah Department of
Professional Licensing. This appeal followed.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
H5
First, we must determine whether the Construction Trades
Licensing Act (Act) requires Appellant to obtain a license and
whether Appellant qualifies for a licensing exemption under the
Act. Second, we must determine whether Appellant's compliance
with the Uniform Building Standards Act excuses any noncompliance
with the Construction Trades Licensing Act. The issues involve
statutory interpretation, which we review for correctness. See
State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
ANALYSIS
^6
We begin our analysis by determining whether the
Construction Trades Licensing Act requires Appellant to obtain a
license prior to constructing off-site modular homes. The Act
requires:
Any person engaged in the construction trades
licensed under this chapter, or as a
contractor regulated under this chapter,
shall become licensed under this chapter
before engaging in that trade or contracting
activity in this state unless specifically
exempted from licensure under Section 58-55305.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-301 (1) (a) (1997). Appellant asserts that
his manufacturing of modular homes is not a construction trade,
and thus he is not required to be licensed under the Act. The
term "construction trade" is defined by the Act as follows:
"Construction trade" means any trade or
occupation involving construction,
alteration, remodeling, repairing, wrecking
or demolition, addition to, or improvement of
any building, highway, road, railroad, dam,
20000350-CA
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bridge, structure, excavation or other
project, development, or improvement to other
than personal property.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-102(5) (1997).
H7
In construing these statutes, we follow the rules of
statutory construction:
A fundamental rule of statutory construction
is that statutes are to be construed
according to their plain language. Only if
the language of a statute is ambiguous do we
resort to other modes of construction.
Furthermore, unambiguous language may not be
interpreted to contradict its plain meaning.
A corollary of this rule is that "a statutory
term should be interpreted and applied
according to its usually accepted meaning,
where the ordinary meaning of the term
results in an application that is neither
unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in
blatant contradiction of the express purpose
of the statute."
O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah
1998) (citations omitted). We find the language of section 5855-102(5) to be unambiguous. Thus, we rely only upon the plain
meaning of thg.. statutory language, and do not resort to any other
mode of constriction.
^|8

The relevant section of the Act provides that the phrase
[c] onstruction trade1 means any trade or occupation involving
construction . . . of any building." Utah Code Ann. § 58-55102(5) (1997). Although determining what constitutes a building
is a question of degree, to conclude that the modular home at
issue is not a building would contradict the plain meaning of the
word. See John Wagner Assocs. v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123,
1128 (Utah-Ct. App. 1990). The modular unit is a completed home
meant for human occupancy. Specifically, it comes complete with
the following: assembled floor decking, exterior and interior
walls, trusses, roof decking, rough electrical wiring, rough
plumbing (including sinks, bathtubs, showers, and kitchen
appliances), rough mechanical systems, shingles, insulation,
sheet rock, cabinets, interior and exterior painting, interior
doors, finishing electrical, finishing plumbing, finishing
mechanical equipment, and finishing exterior siding.
1,1

1|9
In tact, Appellant concedes that he constructs buildings,
and this concession is consistent with case law. In Hercules, we

20000350-CA

3

held that the plain meaning of the word "building," as Used in
Utah's Payment Bond Statute, includes modular of fice^ complexes.
See id. at 1128-29. We follow Hercules to the extent that the
plain meaning of the word "building," as used in the Act r
includes the modular home at issue in this oase. See id. at
1128-29. We conclude that because Appellant constructs
buildings, he is involved in a "construction trade" and must be
licensed under the Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-55-102(5),
-301(1) (a) (1997) .
HlO Appellant next argues the trial court erred in not finding
him exempt from the licensing requirement of the Act. See id.
Specifically, Appellant asserts that he is exempt from the Act's
licensing requirement by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-305(6)
(1997). However, the licensing exemption in section 58-55-305(6)
applies only to "the sale or merchandising of personal property."
Id. There is no dispute that in addition to selling and
merchandising modular homes, Appellant also constructs them. No
language in section 58-55-305(6) exempts the construction of
buildings from the licensing requirement. See id. Our reading
of section 58-55-305(6) is in harmony with Utah Code Ann. § 5855-305(4) (1997), which clearly provides a limited licensing
exemption for property owners' personal construction of
noncommercial, personal-use buildings. Appellant's construction
of modular homes does not fall within the plain meaning of "sale
or merchandising"; therefore, the licensing exemption in section
58-55-305(6) does not apply.
1|ll Finally, Appellant contends that his compliance with the
Uniform Building Standards Act excuses any noncompliance with the
Construction Trades Licensing Act. We disagree. The legislative
purposes for enacting the Construction Trades Licensing Act and
the Uniform Building Standards Act are complementary. The
legislative purpose for the Construction Trades Licensing Act is
to protect the public from "inept and financially irresponsible
builders." American Rural Cellular v. Systems Comm. Corp., 890
P.2d 1035, 1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The legislative purpose
for the Uniform Building Standards Act is to "ensure decent
housing." Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991). Both
acts protect the public, but while one act deals with the
provider, the other act deals with the product. The Construction
Trades Licensing Act also covers financial responsibility of
builders--an area of protection not covered by the Uniform
Building Standards Act.
1)12 Both acts therefore work together in protecting the public.
Just because a contractor is licensed under the Construction
Trades Licensing Act, the contractor's work is not exempt from
compliance with the applicable building codes. The same logic
applies in reverse. Compliance with the applicable building
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codes is required but does not exempt noncompliance with the
Construction Trades Licensing Act. Thus/ -we conclude that a
modular home builder must comply with both' the Construction
Trades Licensing Act and the Uniform Building Standards Afct.
CONCLUSION
ll3 Appellant's construction of modular homes constitutes a
construction trade that requires him to be licensed. Appellant
does not qualify for an exemption from the licensing requirement,
Appellant's compliance with the Uniform Building Standards Act
does not excuse his noncompliance with the Construction Trades
Licensing Act.
Hl4

Accordingly, we affirm,

Russell W. Bench, Judge

JaweK Z. Davis^ATudge

THORNE, Judge (concurring in result):
Hl6 I respectfully disagree with the reasoning relied upon by my
colleagues. I do, however, concur in the result. My
disagreement is based upon the following: (1) I do not believe
that by virtue of constructing the modular home in question,
defendant is precluded from relying upon the licensing exemption
found in Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-305(6) (1997); and (2) I believe
the modular homes constructed by defendant are personal property
until affixed to real property, and thus may qualify as exempt
under section 58-55-305(6). As such, in my view, defendant
satisfies the first two requirements of section 58-55-305(6).
Nevertheless, I would affirm defendant's conviction because he
failed to show that he sold the modular home in question to a
licensed contractor for installation.
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1)17 I agree that, absent an exemption,1 defendant must comply
with the construction trade licensing requirements contained in
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-301(1) (a) (1997), when he sells modular
homes. I believe section 58-55-305 is just such an exemption.
In pertinent part, section 58-55-305(6) provides that the
construction trade licensing requirements do not apply to
a person engaged in the sale or merchandising
of personal property that by its design or
manufacture may be attached, installed, or
otherwise affixed to real property who has
contracted with a person, firm, or
corporation licensed under this chapter to
install, affix or attach that property.
Id. at § 58-55-305(6) (emphasis added).
^18 Based on the language of section 58-55-305(6), the majority
concludes
the licensing exemption in section 58-55305(6) applies only to "the sale or
merchandising of personal property."
. ..
There is no dispute that in addition to
selling and merchandising modular homes,
[defendant] also constructs them. No
language in section 58-55-305(6) exempts the
construction of buildings from the licensing
requirements.
(Emphasis in original.)
^[19 The rules of statutory interpretation mandate that we look
"first to the plain language of the statute . . . and to assume []
that each term was used advisedly by the [L] egislature. " Biddle
v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,^14, 993 P.2d 875. By
virtue of specific inclusion in the construction trades licensing
chapter, persons engaged in these "trades" are bound by the
licensing requirements of the code unless exempted. It makes no
sense to interpret the exemption provision in section 58-55305(6) as exempting only salespersons from the licensing
requirements, when section 58-55-301 does not require such
persons be licensed in the first place. Furthermoie, precluding

1. Section'58-55-301(1) (a) , in relevant
"[a]ny person engaged in the construction
become licensed . . . unless specifically
under Section 58-55-305." Utah Code Ann.
(1997) .
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part, provides that
trades . . . shall
exempted from licensure
§ 58-55-301 (1) (a)

those persons the chapter actually requires to be licensed from
using the section 58-55-305(6) exemption flies in the face of
common sense and renders the statutory exemption nugatory.
Accordingly, I would conclude that being a "constructor/builder"
does not preclude a person from utilizing the exemption.
^20 To benefit from the exemption defendant's modular homes
must first qualify as personal property. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-55-305(6) (stating "a person engaged in the sale or
merchandising of personal property"). Accordingly, we must
decide whether defendant's modular homes are personal property or
real property. The majority opinion, I believe, fails to
adequately resolve this question.
1|21 The majority relies upon John Wagner Assocs. v. Hercules,
Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1127-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), concluding
that
In Hercules, we held that the plain meaning
of the word "building," as used in Utah's
Payment Bond Statute, includes modular office
complexes. . . .
We follow Hercules to the
extent that the plain meaning of the word
"building," as used in [Utah Code Ann. § 5855-301 (a)], includes the modular home at
issue in this case.
Indeed, in Hercules, we stated that "'[w]hat is a building must
always be a question of degree; but ordinarily the word refers to
a structure enclosing a space within walls and roof.'" Hercules,
797 P.2d at 1128 (quoting 12 C.J.S. Building (1980)).
^22 Clearly, the modular home at issue here is a building.
However, the issue in Hercules was whether modular buildings
constructed on-site and secured to the land by gravity
constituted realty. There, we addressed this issue, stating
"' [i]t is settled . . . that a building need not be physically
anchored to the land to be considered realty. It may be found to
be a fixture though it is secured to the realty by force of
gravity alone.'" Id. (quoting Rinaldi v. Goller, 309 P.2d 451,
453 (Cal. 1953)). Obviously, Hercules is distinguishable,
because here defendant's modular home has neither been
transported to its site nor has it been attached, anchored by
gravity, or otherwise affixed to the land.
1|23 Furtnermorfe-K both .case law and legal treatises have
uniformly identified modular homes as personal property because
thesjle^units are "'movable at the time of identification to the
contract'for sale' akd hence are 'goods.'" Burnham v. Mark IV
Hope's, Inc.1:}441 N.EJpd 1027, 1031 (Mass. 1982) (quoting Fuqua
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Homes, Inc. v. Evanston Bldg. & Loan Co., 370 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1977)); see, e.g., Little v. Grizzly Mfg., 636 P.2d 839,
842 (Mont. 1981) (citing and agreeing with Stephenson v. Frazier,
399 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) and Cates v. Morgan Portable
Bldg. Corp., 591 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1979) that modular homes are
goods); see also 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 61 (1999) ("Prefabricated
modular homes are also "goods" when movable at time of
identification to the contract for sale. When a modular home is
already situated on the lot at the time of sale the transaction
is one in real estate . . . ." (Citations omitted.)); Black's
Law Dictionary 1218 (6th ed. 1990) (defining real property as
11
[1] and, and generally whatever is erected or growing upon or
affixed to land").
H24 In the present matter, defendant's modular home was not yet
affixed to land, and hence, was movable, making it "goods" or
personal property. See Burnham, 441 N.E.2d at 1031.
Accordingly, defendant's building satisfies the "personal
property" prong of section 58-55-305(6), until such time as it is
"affixed."
1125 Finally, to qualify for the section 58-55-305(6) exemption,
defendant is required to "contract [] with a person, firm, or
corporation licensed under this chapter to install, affix, or
attach that property." Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-305(6) (1997). My
review of the parties' stipulated facts, which were presented to
the trial court, as well as their responses concerning this
subject during oral argument, reveal that the question of whether
the recipient of defendant's modular home was licensed under
section 55-58-301 was not answered.
1126 A person claiming a statutory exemption has the burden of
producing sufficient facts to qualify for the exemption. See
Parson Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Coram'n, 617 P.2d
397, 398 (Utah 1980) (stating "statutes which provide for
exemptions should be strictly construed and one who so claims has
the burden of showing his entitlement to the exemption"
(footnotes omitted)). Had the record revealed that defendant had
transferred the personal property to a licensed individual, firm,
or company, as required by section 58-55-305(6), I would vacate
the conviction. But, in light of the absence of sufficient facts
demonstrating that defendant contracted to sell the modular home
to a licensed person or firm, I concur in the majority's result.
^ u.aiJ C o u r t L

William'V
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